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Using firm-level data from China’s two recent censuses (Industry Census 1995 and Economic Census 
2004) and a new measure of clustering (industry proximity), we show that China’s rapid industrialization 
is marked by increased clustering. We find supporting evidence that clustering helps ease the credit 
constraints facing many small and medium enterprises through two mechanisms: (1) within a cluster, 
finer division of labor lowers the capital barriers to entry and (2) closer proximity makes the provision of 
trade credit among firms easier. Since both mechanisms reduce the need for external financing, a larger 
number of firms—and thus greater competition—emerge within clusters, which helps explain the higher 
levels of exports and total factor productivity.  This cluster-based industrialization model fit particularly 
well with China’s comparative advantage during its initial stage of takeoff, which was marked by scarcity 
of capital and an inefficient financial system. Hence our findings may be helpful to other developing 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Many have argued that a well-developed financial system is a key prerequisite for industrial development, 
as it can help pool disparate savings to finance large lump-sum investments in machinery and factory 
buildings (Goldsmith 1969; McKinnon 1973; King and Levine 1993; Rajan and Zingales 1998; Ayyagari, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2006). However, China’s rapid industrialization over the past three 
decades seems to defy conventional wisdom. At the incipient stage of reform in the late 1970s, China’s 
financial system was far from developed, by any existing standards (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005). In 
particular, the vast number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) had little access to credit from state-
owned banks (Lin and Li 2001; Wang and Zhang 2003; Lin and Sun 2005). Despite the initial lack of 
financial development, China has achieved the same degree of industrialization in three decades that took 
two centuries to occur in Europe (Summers 2007). Paradoxically, the SMEs in rural China have grown 
much faster than the large firms. How was China able to quickly industrialize in such a credit-constrained 
environment?  
Previous research has suggested reliance on informal financing as the main solution (Allen, Qian, 
and Qian 2005). However, considering that at the onset of China’s reform, a large proportion of rural 
people were poor (Ravallion and Chen 2007), the amount of local savings available for informal financing 
would have been rather limited. Without denying the importance of formal and informal financing in 
overcoming credit constraints, we argue herein that the cost of investment in production technologies may 
not be as prohibitive as suggested in the literature. The presence of credit constraints has the unintended 
consequence of inducing entrepreneurs to divide seemingly integrated production technologies into 
incremental steps by adopting the clustering mode of production. Clustering deepens division of labor, 
hence lowering capital entry barriers and enabling more entrepreneurs to participate in nonfarm 
production. An additional benefit of clustering is the consequent closer proximity of firms, which allows 
more inter-firm trade credit and reduces the need for working capital. Both these channels help lower the 
barriers of entry to industries, which in turn promote competition and growth.  
To establish the link between clustering, financing, and growth, we start by introducing a new 
measure of clustering to better assess the pattern of industrialization in China during the last decade. 
Although there are a large number of measures of regional specialization and industry concentration, they 
do not capture the interconnectedness among firms. For example, in the planned economic era, China 
concentrated its heavy industries in only a few locations. The existing measures would undoubtedly 
indicate a high degree of concentration in these industries at the time. However, this artificial industry 
concentration with little spillover into the local economy is not the same as the emerging patterns of 
clustering observed in post-reform China. 
As has been reported in the media, China’s rapid industrialization has been accompanied by the 
emergence of numerous “specialty cities” of a particular kind.
1
Despite the numerous popular media reports of this phenomenon, few studies have been 
performed to rigorously establish patterns using data covering a large sample and a long time period.
 Thousands of firms, large and small, each 
specialized in a finely defined production step, are lumped together in a densely populated region, where 
some particular manufactured consumer good is churned out by the millions (if not billions) annually. 
Many formerly rural towns in the coastal areas have become so specialized that they boast of themselves 
as the world’s Socks City, Sweater City, Kid’s Clothing City, Footwear Capital, and so on. Each of the 
specialty cities described above fits Porter’s concept of an industrial cluster, which is “a geographically 
proximate group of inter-connected companies (and associated institutions) in a particular field” (Porter 
2000, page 16).  
2
                                                       
1 For example, see 
 
Toward this end, we use complete firm-level data from the China Industrial Census 1995 and the China 
Economic Census 2004 to compute measures of clustering. The measure we focus on, industry proximity, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/24/business/worldbusiness/24china.html for a New York Times report. 
2 Lu and Tao (2009) found a clear trend of industrial agglomeration during the period of 1998-2005. But their sample 
includes only large firms and does not capture the large number of small and medium firms prevalent in “specialty cities”.    
 
2 
allows us for the first time to explore how firms interact with one another, a key feature of clustering as 
highlighted by Porter (1998, 2000). Our results suggest that China’s rapid industrialization during this 
time period was marked by increased clustering — closer interactions among firms within the same 
region.  
We further examine the role of clustering on firm financing. At the county level, we calculate 
both clustering measures and the minimum asset level by industry. We find that clustering is associated 
with lower minimum capital requirements for industrial investment at the county level. With the finer 
division of labor implied by clustering, a production process is decomposed into small steps and thereby 
lowers the minimum capital requirement. Next, based on a panel dataset at the firm level from the two 
censuses, we document that more trade credit is extended among firms within an industrial cluster, thus 
reducing the reliance on external financing for working capital. In a word, clustering eases both starting 
and working capital constraints.  
Because both of the above two mechanisms reduce the need for external financing, they facilitate 
the emergence of a larger number of firms and contribute to the extensive growth of industrial growth. 
Clustering may also boost intensive growth —improvement in firm productivity due to fiercer 
competition of more similar firms. The availability of detailed firm-level data also allows us to correlate 
the observed patterns of clustering with firm performance. We find that firms in more clustered regions 
experience higher export and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. This provides supporting evidence 
that an increase in clustering in the past decade has contributed to improved export performance and 
productivity for firms in China. We view this as evidence that clusters help better align China’s growth 
with its comparative advantage in labor endowment. 
Our paper is unique on several fronts. First, we have access to firm-level data from two time 
periods for China as a whole, which are more disaggregated and updated than data used in previous 
studies. Second, we have adopted a new industry proximity measure to capture the evolving patterns of 
clustering, a key feature of China’s industrialization. Third, we quantitatively show the positive impact of 
clustering on firm finance, growth in firm numbers, and firm performance.  
The study of China’s industrialization may help shed some light on research on industrialization 
in general. China’s miraculously rapid industrialization provides a unique laboratory enabling us to 
observe and understand the process of industrialization. While industrialization in Western Europe and 
North America at the early stages of the Industrial Revolution can now be studied only through the 
relatively dim mirror of history, industrialization can be viewed directly in the ongoing economic 
revolution in China. China’s experience may be relevant to other developing countries characterized by a 
high population density and a low capital-to-labor ratio. A clearer understanding of the industrialization 
processes in China will be of great value in helping propagate these processes to the world’s less fortunate 
regions.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on clustering, finance, 
and industrial development. Section 3 describes the data and the clustering measures, as well as the 
clustering patterns of China’s industrialization. Section 4 examines the role of clustering in firm financing. 






2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON CLUSTERING, FINANCE, AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Industrialization is often accompanied by clustering (or spatial agglomeration) of industrial activities.
3
Italy, Japan, and other East Asian countries and regions experienced a different path of spatial 
clustering during the course of industrialization, which was led by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
In this business model, a large number of SMEs often cluster together, with comprehensive vertical 
division of labor. One noted example is the putting-out system, in which a merchant obtained market 
orders and subcontracted the production to nearby farmers or skilled workers, who usually finished the 
work in their homes or family workshops (Hounshell 1984). The putting-out system was popular in the 
U.K. prior to its Industrial Revolution and was widely observed in nineteenth-century Japan (Nakabayashi 
2006). Outsourcing (or subcontracting), the modern variant of the traditional putting-out system, remains 
a major feature of industrial production organization in contemporary Japan and Taiwan (Sonobe and 
Otsuka 2006). Industrial districts in which different workshops and factories clustered together were 
ubiquitous in France and Italy until the mid-twentieth century and are still viable in some regions of Italy 
(Piore and Sabel 1984; Porter 1998).  
 
The literature has highlighted the positive externalities of industrial clusters. Marshall (1920) lists three 
key externalities: better access to the market and suppliers, labor pooling, and easy flow of technology 
know-how. Porter (1998) argues that clustering is an important way for firms to fulfill their competitive 
advantage. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (2001) view spatial clustering as a key feature of 
industrialization and highlight many of the positive externalities of spatial agglomeration. Two types of 
clustering have been observed during the industrialization process of developed countries. In the U.K., the 
decentralized production system scattered in different family workshops was replaced by a large 
integrated factory system during the Industrial Revolution (Landes 1998). The trend was similar and more 
evident in the United States during its industrialization (Chandler 1977). For example, the auto industry is 
highly concentrated in the Detroit metropolitan area, with several dominant large firms. This type of 
industrial cluster is generally anchored by a few very large firms while other smaller firms act as suppliers.  
Two key differences between the two types of clustering are firm size and number of firms. In the 
second type of clustering, an integrated production process is often disaggregated into many small steps 
that are performed by a large number of SMEs with dispersed ownership. By dividing a production 
process into incremental stages, a large lump-sum investment can be transformed into many small steps, 
thereby lowering the capital entry barriers (Schmitz 1995). Therefore, this mode of industrial organization 
may fit better in countries or regions with scarce capital and less developed financial sectors. Several in-
depth case studies and popular media reports (as mentioned at the beginning of the paper) seem to suggest 
that China followed the second type of cluster-based industrialization path (Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka 2002, 
2004; Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008; Ruan and Zhang 2009). For example, Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka (2002) 
studied how a garment cluster formed in a rural town in Zhejiang Province starting with small-scale 
production in family workshops.  
The limitation of such case studies, however, is the difficulty of generalizing their findings. To 
test whether the patterns described in these studies are typical of the whole economy, one must use 
census-like firm-level data. Furthermore, conventional measures of concentration need to be replaced 
with other measures that can capture the differences between the two types of clusters discussed above, 
that is, how firms within a cluster interact with one another. We introduce such a measure, industry 
proximity, based on the Hausmann-Klinger proximity matrix (Hausmann and Klinger 2006). 
The second line of research that our study closely relates to is the literature on the impact of 
financing constraints on industrial growth and investment. One implicit assumption of the finance and 
growth literature is that production technologies are indivisible. Because of the high cost to build up a 
                                                       
3 In the literature, various terms for the phenomenon of clustering abound, including spatial agglomeration, industrial 
district, cluster, industrial concentration, and so on. In this paper, we prefer to use cluster, as it better captures the 
interconnectedness among firms in a narrowly concentrated location.   
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factory and purchase machinery, in the absence of a capital market it is hard for many poor potential 
entrepreneurs to start their businesses (Banerjee and Newman 1993). Therefore, financial development is 
regarded as a prerequisite to pool savings to finance the investment projects, thereby placing the first-
order importance on economic growth (King and Levine, 1993). However, it is a daunting task to develop 
a well-functioning capital market. In the case of China, rural industrialization took place largely preceding 
the major financial reforms. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) propose that informal financing must be a key 
explanatory factor for China’s rapid industrialization. Recent empirical evidence throws some doubt on 
this hypothesis. Based on firm-level data from the recent Investment and Climate Survey conducted by 
the World Bank, Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) find that firms accessing formal 
financing grow faster than those relying on alternative channels despite the fact that only a small 
percentage of firms received loans from banks. However, formal financing cannot explain the puzzle 
either, as most SMEs, the engine of China’s industrial growth, do not have access to it. Why have vast 
numbers of SMEs survived and prospered in the absence of assessing formal credits in the first place? 
Thus it is hard to resolve the puzzle by looking only at the channel of finance as a determinant of 
industrial growth.  
An unintended consequence of credit constraints is that they may induce innovations in 
production organizations, with the cluster-based production structure being one of them. One key feature 
of clusters in China and other East Asian economies is that production technologies in a cluster are 
decomposed into many incremental steps that are undertaken by different entrepreneurs. Huang, Zhang, 
and Zhu (2008) detailed how the footwear cluster in Wenzhou helped overcome financial, institutional, 
and technological barriers. Ruan and Zhang (2009) in particular demonstrated that with finer division of 
labor, clustering lowers capital entry barriers and enables more entrepreneurs in rural areas, who 
otherwise would continue working in the lower-productivity agricultural sector, to participate in the 
industrial production process.  
These case studies provide insight into how clusters work. To generalize these findings, we use 
firm-level data from China’s two censuses to test the hypothesis that the two following mechanisms help 
firms in clusters overcome financial constraints. First, the inherent finer division of labor in this kind of 
cluster helps lower the capital barriers to entry and enables a large number of low-wealth entrepreneurs 
from rural areas to finance profitable projects in a cluster. And second, the greater proximity and repeated 






3. DATA, PROXIMITY MEASURE, AND PATTERNS OF CHINA’S 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
We utilize firm-level data from the China Industrial Census 1995 and China Economic Census 2004 for 
analysis in this paper. Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics of the gross industrial output based on 
the census data by industry and by province, respectively. Table 3 compares the sample of our datasets 
with the published national aggregate statistics for China in 1995 and 2004. As shown in the table, our 
datasets capture the whole universe of Chinese industrial firms in these two years. Compared to the 
datasets used in previous studies on China’s industrialization patterns (Young 2000; Bai et al. 2004; Wen, 
2004; Zhang and Tan, 2007; Lu and Tao, 2009), our datasets have more comprehensive coverage and 
include industrial firms of all sizes (not only those above a certain scale). Please see Tables 1-2 below for 
summary statistics of gross-industrial output by industry and province of our sample. Table 3 compares 
our data with the official data of gross-industrial output, which shows the comprehensiveness of our data.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics of gross industrial output by two-digit industry  
    1995      2004   
Industry  Mean 
 
SD  No. of firms  Mean 
 
SD  No. of firms 
Coal Mining & Dressing  9,664  96,605  11,953  17,643  224,515  26,822 
Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction  1,066,011  4,254,463  134  962,613  5,758,893  481 
Ferrous Metals Mining & Dressing  5,228  25,019  2,141  9,554  46,737  10,256 
Nonferrous Metals Mining & Dressing  8,554  36,978  3,766  14,919  104,298  6,075 
Non-Metallic Minerals Mining & Dressing  3,087  11,114  11,820  3,293  19,150  34,945 
Other Minerals Mining & Dressing  2,515  4,604  149  3,948  23,920  263 
Foodstuff Processing Industry  10,042  40,142  30,962  13,719  105,609  69,521 
Foodstuff Manufacturing Industry  5,856  34,955  16,313  11,026  87,351  29,811 
Beverage Manufacturing Industry  7,852  43,376  14,719  10,740  96,640  25,485 
Tobacco Processing  237,406  902,942  423  885,794  2,275,005  281 
Spinning Industry  18,002  53,656  24,459  14,029  100,348  83,011 
Manufacturers of Clothes & Other Fiber Products  7,453  25,219  18,937  9,671  58,140  48,250 
Leather, Fur, Feather & Other Products  9,308  30,236  10,468  13,816  59,022  22,677 
Timber Processing & Bamboo, Cane, Palm, Straw 
Products   2,620  12,020  15,480  5,072  32,941  37,028 
Furniture  2,580  9,564  8,760  6,255  39,320  23,892 
Paper Makers & Paper Products  7,303  27,232  13,890  10,005  83,103  39,669 
Printing & Record Medium Reproduction  2,553  9,898  16,763  4,234  21,719  44,070 
Teaching & Sport Products for Daily Use  8,575  31,219  5,356  9,702  42,732  14,711 
Oil Processing & Refining  73,925  716,204  2,744  126,789  1,373,127  7,146 
Chemical Material & Products  13,750  116,761  26,872  19,175  239,355  69,120 
Pharmaceutical & Medicine Manufacturing  16,527  61,057  6,051  29,861  148,194  11,271 
Chemical Fibers  76,277  474,156  1,034  59,128  329,805  3,372 
Rubber Products  13,294  74,614  4,663  13,490  128,384  15,178 
Plastic Products  5,856  20,254  19,255  7,573  44,341  69,729 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products  4,926  18,678  61,278  6,306  32,082  157,734 
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals  44,108  479,425  8,429  84,284  961,069  20,494 
Smelting & Pressing of Non-Ferrous Metals  29,697  143,612  4,621  41,174  259,277  15,162 
Metal Products  5,534  24,407  26,744  7,849  52,709  80,976 
Common Machines  7,719  41,075  31,474  9,032  80,815  113,691 
Special Equipment  10,805  69,347  18,391  10,556  84,887  55,095 
Traffic Equipment  17,009  216,986  19,522  27,664  475,230  51,844 
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and 
Apparatus  13,206  74,917  18,928  20,680  249,967  54,979 
Electrical Machines & Equipment  34,343  250,416  5,489  74,793  1,048,297  15,211 
Electronic & Communication Equipment  12,552  75,699  9,735  40,516  532,205  35,203 
Instruments, Culture & Office Devices  4,576  17,211  12,127  6,966  38,783  26,627  
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Table 1. Continued 
    1995      2004   
Industry  Mean 
 
SD  No. of firms  Mean 
 
SD  No. of firms 
 
Recycling of Material Waste and Scrap  2,799  10,227  4,440  4,491  28,720  6,156 
Electricity, Steam, Thermal Power Production & 
Supply  19,369  107,370  12,600  60,653  1,052,128  24,568 
Coal Gas Production & Supply  20,474  82,663  372  30,310  130,000  1,445 
Tap Water Production & Supply  3,545  29,942  5,147  5,058  34,173  11,035 
Total   10,763  134,410  506,409  16,198  310,686  1,363,284 
Note: The gross industrial output is reported in thousands of RMB at current prices.  
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of gross industrial output by province 
         1995        2004    
Province  Province 
code  
Mean  SD  No. of 
firms 
Mean  SD  No. of 
firms 
Beijing   BJ  15,067  256,247  9,623  18,926  418,528  31,364 
Tianjin   TJ  13,638  155,565  10,735  23,949  500,129  25,432 
Hebei   HEB  9,216  80,343  23,592  15,789  201,284  64,062 
Shanxi   SX  8,538  91,723  11,416  14,490  216,240  28,641 
Neimeng  NM  5,559  83,740  9,432  19,689  223,747  11,759 
Liaoning   LN  10,184  171,331  29,435  16,844  365,899  54,115 
Jilin   JL  7,751  167,292  13,100  22,085  542,689  16,037 
Heilongjiang   HLJ  8,524  308,216  18,745  19,613  738,370  20,101 
Shanghai   SH  23,260  273,997  16,690  26,263  499,886  55,315 
Jiangsu   JS  15,815  106,861  41,582  15,618  262,800  187,212 
Zhejiang   ZJ  10,363  58,130  32,725  11,236  173,580  187,588 
Anhui   AH  6,912  64,940  23,474  10,808  189,114  38,827 
Fujian   FJ  8,080  47,063  19,038  15,126  225,394  49,532 
Jiangxi   JX  4,528  45,443  18,253  9,331  146,981  29,144 
Shandong   SD  17,466  179,590  26,980  20,477  303,314  119,699 
Henan   HEN  9,703  75,318  23,119  12,065  164,347  76,292 
Hubei   HUB  10,432  139,562  20,881  18,191  359,619  28,937 
Hunan   HUN  5,738  66,417  23,720  9,668  145,047  43,529 
Gongdong  GD  17,715  114,052  34,536  22,969  473,908  136,606 
Gongxi  GX  7,719  42,786  12,312  11,870  155,918  18,753 
Hainan   HAIN  9,932  52,781  1,278  21,086  198,547  2,025 
Chongqing   CQ  6,676  82,141  11,456  12,677  149,313  20,359 
Sichuan   SC  6,675  74,866  26,380  12,137  168,971  43,325 
Guizhou   GZ  5,500  48,962  7,450  13,831  178,497  10,996 
Yunnan   YN  13,970  223,904  6,267  16,157  239,845  14,271 
Tiebet  TB  2,343  6,554  295  7,004  22,096  354  
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 Table 2. Continued. 
         1995        2004    
Province  Province 
code  
Mean  SD  No. of 
firms 
Mean  SD  No. of 
firms 
Shaanxi   SAX  6,182  60,000  12,950  12,251  209,434  25,573 
Gansu   GS  8,260  109,848  7,140  14,648  305,597  11,549 
Qinghai   QH  8,193  77,821  1,446  17,524  218,482  2,168 
Ningxia  NX  9,011  56,606  1,706  15,132  151,483  3,984 
Xinjiang  XJ  9,990  187,435  5,077  28,813  441,176  5,735 
Total     10,725  134,909  500,833  16,198  310,686  1,363,284 
Note: The gross industrial output is reported in thousands of RMB at current prices. 
 
Table 3. Comparing sample with aggregate data 
  Gross Industrial Output (trillions of RMB, at current prices) 
          Sample (1)  Statistical Yearbook (2)  (1)/(2)*100% 
1995  5.495  5.526  99.438 
2004  20.174  18.722  107.754 
       
Note: The official figures for gross industrial output and industrial value added are from the China Statistical Yearbook for 1996 
and 2005. However, the official figures in the China Statistical Yearbook 2005 do not include non-state-owned small enterprises 
below a certain scale. Therefore, the ratio of the tabulated to official figures exceeds one in 2004.  
 
Since the data are at the firm level, we can calculate the degree of clustering at any level of our 
choice, such as township, county, prefecture, or province, for regional aggregation, and two-, three-, or 
four-digit industry level for sectoral aggregation. For the main part of the analysis, we choose county and 
four-digit CIC (China Industry Code) as the levels of aggregation, because counties are the most 
important level of government in making economic decisions including fiscal support and taxation. But 
for robustness tests, we also used prefecture and provincial levels for geographic aggregation, and three-
digit and two-digit CICs for industrial aggregation. When constructing the clustering measures, we first 
determined the level of aggregation to convert firm-level data to cell-level totals, where each cell is a 
combination of a certain level of region and a certain level of industry. For example, the most detailed cell 
is the combination of four-digit CIC and county. We then create the clustering measure using the cell-
level data.  
China modified its industry coding system in 2002 (switching from GB1994 to GB2002). 
Therefore, when studying changes between 1995 and 2004, we match industry codes that changed from 
1994 to 2002 as follows: for industry codes that became more disaggregated in the 2002 coding system, 
we use the 1994 codes as the standard; for those that became more aggregated, we use the 2002 codes as 
the standard. In other words, we use the more aggregated codes to group and compare industries between 
1995 and 2004. During the period between the two censuses (1995–2004), the territories of some counties 
were also redrawn and the names of others changed. We have carefully tracked these changes to match 
the counties throughout the time period. 
Conventional measures of industrial agglomeration are based on regional specialization or 
industrial concentration. The market share of a certain number of the largest, say, three firms, in an 
industry or region is often used as a concentration measure. The advantage of this measure is that it is 
easy to calculate and interpret, but when the distribution of firms is relatively spread out, it may miss 
those firms below the cut-off lines. To overcome this problem, the Gini coefficient is often used to 
calculate the regional variation of output or employment shares for all the firms in an industry. Krugman 
(1991) modifies the Gini coefficient by accounting for the discrepancy between a region’s share of  
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output/employment in a certain industry and its share in all manufacturing industries in calculating the 
Gini coefficient.  
However, these concentration measures do not distinguish between the following two kinds of 
“agglomeration”: one in which a small number of large firms with minimum interfirm connections are 
located, versus the other in which a large number of variously sized firms congregate and interact closely 
with one another. While the first type of agglomeration characterizes cities such as Detroit, the second 
type of agglomeration seems to better fit the patterns observed in coastal China, where thousands of firms 
of all sizes are densely populated in a small region, closely intertwined with one another throughout the 
production processes, all the while churning out thousands of products with breathtaking efficiency. 
The second type of agglomeration fits very well into the definition of clusters given by Porter, 
whose concept of an industrial cluster is summarized as “a geographically proximate group of inter-
connected companies (and associated institutions) in a particular field” (Porter 2000, page 16). Although 
the concept is intuitive and extremely easy to understand, the measurement of interconnectedness seems 
more elusive. To our knowledge, no previous studies have directly measured it except in case studies in 
which firms can provide detailed information on how they interact with other firms.  
Such detailed information is necessarily absent for large-scale studies like ours. In the absence of 
the first-best information, we analyze Porter’s concept of clustering more carefully to explore alternative 
ways of measuring the interconnectedness among firms. When delineating the main actors within a 
cluster, Porter states, “They include, for example, suppliers of specialized inputs such as components, 
machinery, and services as well as providers of specialized infrastructure. Clusters also often extend 
downstream to channels or customers and laterally to manufacturers of complementary products or 
companies related by skills, technologies, or common inputs” (Porter 2000, 16–17, italics added by 
authors). In addition, Porter emphasizes that one main benefit derived from geographically concentrated 
clusters is that industries in the same cluster share common technologies, skills, knowledge, inputs, and 
institutions. Previous work has also shown that technology linkages among related industries are an 
important engine for innovation (Scherer 1982; Feldman and Audresch 1999). 
The works cited above suggest one way to measure the interconnectedness in the cluster concept 
as defined by Porter. If industries and firms produce similar goods, then they are more likely to use 
similar combinations of inputs in their production processes, and more likely to rely on the same set of 
suppliers and clients, and thus are more likely to be interconnected as being related by skills, technologies, 
and other common inputs. The similarity among products of industries can thus be used as a measure for 
clustering, as defined by Porter.  
New results obtained by Hausmann and Klinger (2006) allow us to implement the above measure 
of interconnectedness among industries (and participating firms) in a cluster. Hausmann and Klinger 
(2006) constructed a proximity matrix for all four-digit SITC products, in which the proximity between 
any two goods captures their similarity in the following sense: If the two goods need the same 
combination of inputs (or endowments and capabilities) to produce, then there is a higher probability that 
a country has a comparative advantage in both, and the two products have a high proximity. In other 
words, if we have trade data from all countries on all goods, we can then compute the probability of a 
country simultaneously having a comparative advantage in any pair of goods to measure how close the 
two goods are to each other in terms of input or capability requirements.  
Specifically, Hausmann and Klinger propose the proximity between two products i and j to be 
computed as follows: )} | ( ), | ( min{ , i j j i j i x x P x x P p = , where xi=1 if a country has the revealed 
comparative advantage in product i (or if RCAi >1), and 0 otherwise, while the conditional probabilities 
) | ( ), | ( i j j i x x P x x P are computed using trade information on all countries.  
To get to the intuition of the formula, consider the pair of goods of ostrich meat (good i) and 
metal ores (good j). Some countries such as Australia export both goods. The formula implies that the 
probability of exporting metal ores given that a country exports ostrich meat is large, but the probability 
that a country exports ostrich meat given that it exports metal ores is very low, since although Australia 
exports both, Chile, Peru, and Zambia do not export ostrich meat but do export metals. The proximity  
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between ostrich meat and metal ores will thus be low, because the formula requires the minimum of the 
two conditional probabilities, with ) | ( j i x x P being low, despite a high ) | ( i j x x P . Thus, the formula is 
superior to a simple conditional probability ) | ( j i x x P or ) | ( i j x x P .  
The proximity measure also isolates the degree of similarity between the two goods from how 
prevalent they are in different countries. An alternative measure for proximity is the joint 
probability ) ( j i x x P ∩ , which Hausmann and Klinger rejected for the following reason. Consider ostrich 
meat and ostrich eggs, two goods with extremely high similarity, because every single country that 
exports ostrich eggs also exports ostrich meat. But if only three countries in the world export these two 
goods, “then the joint probability for any single country exporting the two would be small, instead of 
large.” (Hausmann and Klinger 2006, page 10) The problem with using the joint probability to measure 
proximity is that it combines the degree of similarity between the two goods and their prevalence in 
different parts of the world. 
Since products more likely to be exported together depend on the same comparative advantages, 
the proximity between two products captures the degree of similarity between these products in terms of 
how much their production processes need the same endowments and production capabilities. Firms and 
industries that produce these products are then more likely to interact with one another in various ways, 
including dependence on similar inputs (be they raw materials, labor, or machinery), reliance on similar 
technologies and research and development, and even dependence on the same supply or marketing 
facilities. Thus, those industries producing products that are more proximate in the Hausmann-Klinger 
space are likely to be more interconnected in the Porter sense. As a result, this proximity measure can be 
used to provide a gauge for how closely interconnected industries and their participating firms are within 
a specific region. 
The proximity measure has some additional nice features as an indicator of industry 
interconnectedness: (1) as a characteristic of the production technology based on export/import 
information from all countries, it applies to all countries, be they open or closed; (2) computed as the 
minimum between two conditional probabilities, it is a symmetric measure; and (3) by focusing on 
countries with a revealed comparative advantage in product i (i.e., xi=1 if a country has the revealed 
comparative advantage in product i [or if RCAi >1] and 0 otherwise), the measure captures all the 
significant exports but leaves aside the noise; and, (4) finally, by computing the average proximities 
between 1998 and 2000, the Hausmann-Klinger proximity matrix integrates some stability over time. 
We begin with the product proximity matrix constructed by Hausmann and Klinger (2006). 
Because the proximity matrix is computed for products at the four-digit SITC level, we have made a 
concerted effort to convert the CICs first to ISICs and then to SITCs based on the manuals obtained from 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics as well as correspondence tables from Eurostat and the United 
Nations. Given that both CICs and ISICs are industry-level codes, while SITCs are based on products, 
there are many cases in which we have one industry correspond to more than one product. In such cases, 
we give equal weights (that sum up to 1) to the products produced by the industry. Specifically, our 
procedures are as follows: (1) Aggregate output, asset, and employment to the cell level, where the cell is 
defined as a combination of county and a four-digit CIC industry. (2) Convert the CIC first to ISIC and 
then to SITC based on the manuals obtained from China’s National Bureau of Statistics as well as 
correspondence tables from Eurostat and the United Nations. (3) For each industry in a cell, calculate its 
average proximity to all industries located in the same region, using the Hausmann-Klinger product 
proximity matrix, which gives the proximity (or the inverse distance) between each pair of products (and 
between each pair of industries through the conversion procedures above). The average proximity for 
each industry (for a certain region) is computed as a weighted average using the size of the other industry 
in each pair as the weight. (4) Finally, the average industry proximity for each region is computed as the 
average of the proximities of all the industries in that region, weighted by the size of each industry.  
The proximity measure can be based on assets, employment, or output. In other words, the 
weights discussed above that are used to adjust for the size of each industry can be assets, employment, or  
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output. We use all these measures, as they may provide different angles of clustering. An illustration 
follows. Consider a region with three industries: steel, automobiles, and rubber. Intuitively, the 
automobile industry has a high proximity to both the steel and rubber industries, while the proximity 
between the other two is low. Now suppose that the region has experienced faster growth in the auto 
industry than in the other industries. Following the procedures describe above, we see that the average 
proximity of the auto industry has not changed, since the relative weights of the other two industries have 
not changed. But the average industry proximity of the whole region has increased, because the industry 
that is closer to the others, the auto industry in this case, has grown faster. Now consider the role of the 
weight. If the growth of the auto industry is in its output relative to those of the other industries, then the 
greater interconnectedness among industries in the region will be reflected in a greater proximity using 
output as the weight. Proximity measures weighted by asset or employment can be understood 
accordingly.  
These three proximities may therefore measure different kinds of interconnectedness, which in 
turn imply different kinds of cluster effects. Marshall (1920) outlined three types of advantages from 
agglomeration or clusters: labor market pooling, specialized supplies, and technological spillovers. Large 
populations of skilled laborers enter the area and are able to exchange knowledge, ideas, and information. 
In addition, there is increased access to the specialized goods and services provided for the clustering 
firms, which provides increasing returns to scale for each of the firms located within that area because of 
the proximity to the available sources needed for production. Finally, clustering in specific fields leads to 
quicker diffusion and adoption of ideas.  
Although likely to contribute to all three of these advantages, output-weighted proximity is 
probably more conducive to technological spillovers, since the output can be used as input in the 
production of other industries in the same region, while employment-weighted proximity implies more 
labor-market pooling, and asset-weighted proximity implies more specialized supplies, especially in 
capital goods. All these effects of agglomeration will lead to higher productivity at the firm level. 
In addition, we emphasize in this paper another effect of agglomeration that has not drawn 
enough attention previously, namely, its impact on firm finances. We argue that industrial clusters help 
alleviate firms’ financial constraints through two channels: (1) the finer division of labor among firms 
within an industrial cluster lowers capital requirements for these firms and (2) trade credit extended 
among firms within an industrial cluster helps diminish the need for external financing. As financial 
transactions permeate the whole production process, including labor hiring, asset purchasing, and product 
sales, we expect all three measures of proximity to play a role in helping overcome firms’ financial 
constraints. 
Using the proximity measures described above, we found that within each region, the proximity 
among industries increased significantly between 1995 and 2004.
4
                                                       
4 Interestingly, we find similar results using other conventional concentration measures, including the Hirfendahl index and 
Gini coefficient. See Long and Zhang (2009) for details.  
 Table 4 presents the industry proximity 
measure for each of the Chinese provinces in 1995 and 2004, based on output. The measures constructed 
at the prefecture and the county levels give the same pattern of higher industry proximity in each region in 




Table 4. Regional specialization and proximity (output) 
Province  1995  2004 
Beijing   0.206  0.220 
Tianjin   0.194  0.208 
Hebei   0.212  0.219 
Shanxi   0.207  0.208 
Neimeng  0.198  0.214 
Liaoning   0.204  0.205 
Jilin   0.206  0.220 
Heilongjiang   0.186  0.197 
Shanghai   0.222  0.219 
Jiangsu   0.210  0.210 
Zhejiang   0.211  0.220 
Anhui   0.204  0.211 
Fujian   0.208  0.202 
Jiangxi   0.200  0.206 
Shandong   0.200  0.205 
Henan   0.201  0.209 
Hubei   0.207  0.216 
Hunan   0.201  0.210 
Guangdong  0.209  0.215 
Guangxi  0.208  0.214 
Hainan   0.201  0.207 
Chongqing   0.206  0.197 
Sichuan   0.198  0.202 
Guizhou   0.188  0.196 
Yunnan   0.187  0.197 
Tibet  0.223  0.238 
Shaanxi   0.191  0.192 
Gansu   0.199  0.205 
Qinghai   0.197  0.217 
Ningxia  0.215  0.22 
Xinjiang  0.190  0.199 
Weighted sample average  0.206  0.211 
Difference                                         0.005 (0.001)*** 
Note: the symbol *** stands for that the test is significant at 1% level.  
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Figure 2.  Industry Proximity within County (1995 vs. 2004)  
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4. CLUSTERING AND FIRM FINANCING 
We now turn to explore the effects of such increased industry proximity in a geographical location, with 
our first focus on firm finances. Table 5 provides summary statistics of variables used in the analysis in 
this and the next sections. As discussed previously, there are two potential mechanisms through which 
clusters may help alleviate financial constraints for firms located in the clusters. First, because firms are 
more interconnected, finer division of labor becomes feasible, which reduces the capital requirement for 
firms on average. Second, the interconnectedness among firms in a narrow location may facilitate inter-
firm financing through trade credit. 
Table 5. Summary statistics of variables used in regressions 
Variable  Mean  SD  Min  Max  N 
Panel A: county-level variables           
Proximity 2004 (w=output)  0.226  0.038  0.000  0.631  2,833 
Proximity 2004 (w=employment)  0.220  0.032  0.000  0.403  2,834 
Proximity 2004 (w=asset)  0.226  0.035  0.091  0.397  2,833 
Proximity 1995 (w=output)  0.217  0.030  0.000  0.495  2,764 
Proximity 1995 (w=employment)  0.222  0.037  0.000  0.495  2,756 
Proximity 1995 (w=asset)  0.218  0.031  0.000  0.495  2,765 
Minimum asset 2004 (in millions)  0.178  1.536  0.000  33.001  2,860 
Minimum asset 1995 (in millions)  0.101  1.454  0.000  57.603  2,791 
Panel B: firm-level variables           
Firm age  17.601  14.358  0.000  99.000  104,324 
Private%  0.146  0.340  0.000  1.000  104,324 
HMT%  0.062  0.216  0.000  1.000  104,324 
Other foreign%  0.025  0.139  0.000  1.000  104,324 
Log(value added)  7.357  1.973  -2.591  17.253  104,324 
Log(value added1)  7.396  1.992  -2.461  17.309  103,016 
Log(asset)  8.933  1.941  0.693  18.235  104,324 
Log(employment)  4.339  1.791  0.000  13.317  104,324 
Export/sales  0.060  0.203  0.000  1.000  152,122 
Exporter  0.118  0.322  0.000  1.000  152,260 
Accounts receivable/revenue  0.257  0.287  0.000  1.999  93,792 
Accounts payable/total debt  0.204  0.247  0.000  1.187  112,321 
Debt/asset  0.639  0.316  0.000  2.997    112,321 
Fixed asset/asset  0.383  0.222  0.000  1.000    112,321 
Note: HMT stands for firms owned by Hong Kong, Marco, and Taiwan. Year04 is a dummy variable for 2004. 
 
To explore the effect of clustering on firms’ capital requirements, we look at the minimum level 
of assets among firms within a certain region. It is thus crucial that our sample does not exclude firms due 
to their small size. The 1995 and 2004 censuses that include all industrial firms provide the ideal data for 
computing for each county the minimum level of assets and testing the hypothesis. Table 6 shows results 
from the following regression: 
 




where c indicates county, min(assetc,2004) is the minimum level of assets in 2004, min(assetc,1995) is the 
minimum level of assets in 1995, Pc,1995 is the industry proximity in 1995, and ε is the random error term. 
Therefore, the coefficient β2 shows the effect of industry proximity in a region on the minimum 
requirement of capital for firms located in that region. We evaluate the minimum capital requirement 
using multiple measures: the lowest level of asset among firms in a certain region, the 5 percentile level 
of asset, and the 10 percentile level of asset in Table 6. 
Table 6. Minimum level of assets and proximity at county level  
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dependent variable=minimum asset in 2004 
Minimum asset in 1995   0.450***  0.452***  0.448***  0.260*** 
  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.028) 
Proximity in 1995 (w=asset)  -1.569**       
  (0.785)       
Proximity in 1995 (w=employment)    -3.061***     
    (0.622)     
Proximity in 1995 (w=output)      -0.787   
      (0.801)   
R-squared  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.03 
 
  Dependent variable=5 percentile level of asset in 2004 
5 percentile asset in 1995   0.544***  0.554***  0.544***  0.324*** 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.024) 
Proximity in 1995 (w=asset)  -1.875**       
  (0.770)       
Proximity in 1995 (w=employment)    -3.393***     
    (0.609)     
Proximity in 1995 (w=output)      -1.262   
      (0.787)   
R-squared  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.06 
  Dependent variable=10 percentile asset in 2004 
10 percentile asset in 1995   0.490***  0.502***  0.490***  0.304*** 
  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.024) 
Proximity in 1995 (w=asset)  -2.044***       
  (0.781)       
Proximity in 1995 (w=employment)    -3.581***     
    (0.619)     
Proximity in 1995 (w=output)      -1.471*   
      (0.799)   
R-squared  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.05 
Observations  2761  2752  2760  2782 
Note: Minimum asset is the lowest amount, the lowest 5 percentile, and the lowest 10 percentile of assets among firms at the 
county level in 2004 (in millions of RMB), respectively, in the three panels. The symbols *, **, and *** stand for significance 
level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
As shown in Table 6, no matter which measure of minimum capital requirement is used, higher 
proximity, measured in both asset and employment, is correlated with a lower level of minimum asset,  
 
16 
consistent with the argument that clustering facilitates a finer division of labor and thus reduces the 
capital requirement for firms. The proximity in output is also negatively related to minimum assets at the 
county level, but the effect is only close to significant for two of the minimum capital requirement 
measures (but significant for the 10 percentile level of asset). The effects of proximity in assets and 
employment are economically important as well. In particular, a standard-error increase in industry 
proximity (0.03) will lead to a reduction in the minimum capital requirement of RMB 50,000 for a typical 
county, which accounts for about 39 percent of the average minimum capital requirement. As expected, 
the minimum capital requirement in 1995 is positively correlated with that in 2004. Column 4 shows that 
when industry proximity is dropped from the regression, the 1995 minimum capital requirement remains 
significant but the R-square drops by 2 percent, which is the additional explanatory power of industry 
proximity. 
To study the effects of industry proximity on trade credit, we use firm-level data from 1995 and 
2004. Since detailed accounting information is provided for only a subsample of firms even in the census 
years of 1995 and 2004, we cannot aggregate the data into county level as for the minimum-asset data. 
Instead, we construct a balanced panel of firms for which information is available.
5
 
 The estimation 
regression is as follows: 
trade creditict = αc+ μt + β*Pct + γZ + ε,         (2) 
 
where i, c, and t indicate firm, county, and year, respectively; P is the proximity measure at the county 
level by year; Z is a vector of firm characteristics; and ε is the random error term. Therefore, the 
coefficient β shows the effect of industry proximity in a region on the provision of trade credit among 
firms located in that region. We use two measures for trade credit: accounts payable / total debt, and 
accounts receivable / revenue. While the former measures the proportion of the firm’s debt that is 
financed by its trading partners, the latter indicates the degree to which the firm provides credit to its 
business partners. The basis for trade credit is frequent business transactions among firms. Thus, a larger 
amount of trade credit indicates a higher degree of inter-firm connectedness. But it is crucial that both 
types of trade credit are considered together to draw the above conclusion, as accounts payable and 
accounts receivable considered separately may merely manifest the competitiveness of the market in 
which the firm is located. A higher level of accounts payable implies that the firm is in a buyer’s market 
for its inputs, while a higher level of accounts receivable implies a buyer’s market for the firm’s products.   
Table 7 shows that all three proximity measures are positively correlated with both measures of 
trade credit.
6
                                                       
5 Given that the panel covers only two years, the singletons in the unbalanced panel are dropped out in the fixed effect 
estimation due to the demeaning process. Thus the results based on the unbalanced panel give the same results as the balanced 
panel.  
 Specifically, for accounts payable as a percentage of total debt, proximity measures 
weighted by assets, employment, and output all have positive and significant effects. For a standard-error 
increase in industry proximity (about 0.025), the ratio of accounts payable to total debt increases by about 
0.7 percentage points, which amounts to about 3 percent of the average ratio of accounts payable to total 
debt. If proximity increases from the lowest to the highest level, then the ratio of accounts payable to total 
debt increases by about 8 percentage points, which amounts to almost 40 percent of the average ratio of 
accounts payable to total debt. Therefore, these effects are of non-negligible magnitude. 
6 Based on the investment climate survey conducted by the World Bank, Cull, Xu, and Zhu (2009) find that trade credit does 
not play a significant role in firm performance among Chinese firms. There are two possible reasons for the difference between 
their findings and ours. First, the firm size in their sample is larger than that in the industrial and economic censuses used in this 
paper. Because large firms are more likely to access formal bank credit, their demand for trade credit is lower than that of smaller 
firms. Second, they do not relate trade credit to cluster development. Our point is that clustering facilitates the extension of trade 




Table 7. Trade credit and proximity at firm level 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Dependent variable= accounts 
payable/total debt  
Dependent variable= accounts 
receivable/revenue  
Proximity_asset  0.165**      0.221***     
  (0.066)      (0.081)     
Proximity_employment    0.297***      0.256***   
    (0.060)      (0.072)   
Proximity_output      0.192***      0.163** 
      (0.064)      (0.080) 
Firm age  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Log(sales)  -0.007***  -0.007***  -0.007***  -0.097***  -0.097***  -0.097*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Debt/asset  -0.098***  -0.097***  -0.098***  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Fixed asset/total asset  -0.148***  -0.148***  -0.148***  -0.236***  -0.236***  -0.236*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Private share%   -0.035***  -0.035***  -0.035***  0.014***  0.014***  0.014*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
HMT share%  0.230***  0.229***  0.230***  0.019  0.017  0.018 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
Other foreign share%  0.422***  0.420***  0.422***  0.024  0.024  0.024 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
Year04   0.067***  0.069***  0.067***  0.056***  0.058***  0.056*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant  0.292***  0.262***  0.286***  1.109***  1.100***  1.122*** 
  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Observations  112,324  112,321  112,324  93,601  93,600  93,601 
R-squared  0.80  0.80  0.80  0.87  0.87  0.87 
Note: Sample includes only firms that are surveyed in both censuses. Accounts receivable/revenue and accounts payable/total 
debt are used as two different measures of trade credit among firms. HMT stands for firms owned by Hong Kong, Marco, and 
Taiwan. The symbols *, **, and *** stand for significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
The coefficient for the private firm indicator is significantly positive for extending trade credit 
and negative for receiving trade credit, implying that private firms tend to be in buyer’s markets for their 
products but seller’s markets for their supplies. Coupled with the lending policies of state banks 
preference for larger firms, in particular state-owned enterprises, these results highlight the need for 
private firms to look for alternative financial access. 
The results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that two mechanisms are at work in regions with higher 
industry proximity that facilitate firm financial access. With lower entry barriers and easy access to trade 
credit, one expects more firms to emerge. Indeed, this is what we have observed, as shown in Table 8. At 
the county level, a higher degree of proximity in 1995 is correlated with a larger number of firms in 2004, 
after controlling for the number of firms in 1995. This finding is consistent regardless of which proximity  
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measure is used. In particular, the effect of proximity is substantially larger (about twice as large) when 
we focus on the number of small firms (with output below 5 million RMB). These findings suggest that 
the type of clustering measured by the proximity index is different from the Detroit type, in which a small 
number of very large firms emerge as the dominant players. Rather, it portrays a pattern similar to the 
East Asian cluster-based industrialization model, in which a large number of firms are present, often of 
small and medium size. Lu and Tao (2009) also find that there have been more and smaller firms in 
China’s manufacturing industries between 1998 and 2005.  
Table 8. Effects of proximity on firm number 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Dependent variable = Log(average number of firms) in 2004 
  All firms  Small firms 
Proximity_ output  2.846***      5.944***      
  (0.463)      (1,298)     
Proximity_employment    2.097***      4.721***   
    (0.370)      (0.965)   
Proximity_ asset       2.079***      5.854*** 
      (0.455)      (1.175) 
Log(average firm 
number) in 1995 
1.077***  1.079***  1.075***  0.354***  0.349***  0.350*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Constant  -0.249**  -0.104  -0.076  0.460*  0.714***  0.479* 
  (0.118)  (0.100)  (0.116)  (0.272)  (0.226) 
 
(0.266) 
Observations  2,760  2,752  2,761  2,708  2,701  2,709 
R-squared  0.72  0.72  0.72  0.07  0.07  0.07 




5. CLUSTERING AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
The results in the previous section give evidence of greater competition in regions with higher industrial 
proximity. And greater competition is expected to help improve firm performance. Our next analysis thus 
addresses firm exports and TFP growth. As discussed above, increased proximity may lead to 
productivity improvements due to increased pooling of labor, easier access to specialized inputs, and 
technological spillovers. In addition, as shown in the previous section, by lowering the capital barriers, 
clustering enables more potential entrepreneurs scattered in rural areas to engage in more productive 
industrial production. The wide availability of trade credit inherent in clusters also eases firms’ working 
capital constraints and boosts output. Thus, we will look at the effects of the proximity measures on firm 
performance. 
We first examine the impact of proximity and geographical concentration on export growth, using 
the following estimation specification: 
 
exportict = = αc+ μt + β*Pct + γZ + ε,        (3) 
 
where i, c, and t indicate firm, county, and year, respectively; export is share of export value in total sales 
or a dummy variable indicating whether a firm exported in a certain year; P is the clustering measure at 
the county level by year; Z is a vector of firm characteristics including firm age, firm scale (measured by 
the ratio between firm revenue and the industry average revenue), and firm ownership types; and ε is the 
random error term. Therefore, the coefficient β shows the effect of industry proximity in a region on the 
labor productivity of firms located in that region.  
 




log(Yict) = αc+ μt + β1*log(Kict) + β2*log(Lict) + β3*Pct + γZ + ε,        (4) 
 
where i, c, and t denote firm, county, and year, respectively; Y is value added; K and L refer to assets and 
labor; P is a clustering measure at the county level by year; Z is a vector of firm characteristics (including 
firm age and firm ownership type); and ε is the random error term. The coefficient β3 measures the effect 
of industry proximity in a region on the TFP of firms located in that region. To allow the possibility that 
the production function may have changed between 1995 and 2004, we also include the year 2004 
dummy as well as its interaction terms with the logs of K and L. 
Tables 9 and 10 present results from the above estimation. All three proximity measures are 
found to have positive effects on both the export and total factor productivity of the firms, and the effects 
are also economically important. Specifically, an increase in industry proximity of a standard deviation 
(0.03) will lead to a 0.65 percentage point increase in the export-to-sales ratio, amounting to about 12 
percent of the average export-to-sales ratio. The corresponding effect on the likelihood of the firm being 
an exporter is 0.3 percentage points, which is about 4 percent of the firms that are exporters. In terms of 
the effect on TFP, a standard-deviation increase in industry proximity leads to a 1.8 percentage point 
increase in TFP. In summary, even after controlling for capital intensity and other firm characteristics, we 
still find evidence showing the positive and non-negligible effects of greater industry proximity on firm 
performance. Firms in clusters are more productive and more competitive in the international market. As 
the results are obtained after controlling for firm fixed effects in a balanced panel, they reflect effects of 
clustering on firms that existed in both years, instead of those on firms that are new entrants.
8
                                                       
7 Truncation of the negative values of value added may be a concern. But by comparing the sample sizes in column 1 and 
column 4, the reduction in sample size is only 3,500 out of 69,000 (about 5%), which does not seem a major concern to us. 
 
8 In addition, the panel analysis also mitigates the concern with sample selection as we study the effect of proximity change 





Table 9. Proximity and export 
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
  Dependent variable=export/sales  Dependent variable=exporter 
Proximity_asset  0.215***      0.140***     
  (0.032)      (0.049)     
Proximity_employment    0.292***      0.099**   
    (0.029)      (0.044)   
Proximity_output      0.207***      0.095** 
      (0.032)      (0.048) 
Firm age  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Log(sales)  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.025***  0.025***  0.025*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Private share%   0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.031***  0.031***  0.032*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
HMT share%  0.208***  0.207***  0.208***  0.041***  0.041***  0.041*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Other foreign share%  0.188***  0.187***  0.188***  -0.112***  -0.112***  -0.112*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Year04   0.048***  0.050***  0.048***  0.064***  0.065***  0.064*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant  -0.087***  -0.106***  -0.085***  -0.146***  -0.137***  -0.136*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
 
Observations  152,126  152,122  152,126  152,126  152,122  152,126 
R-squared  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.78  0.78  0.78 
Note: Sample includes only firms that are surveyed in both censuses. Exporter is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm exported in a certain year. HMT stands for firms 
owned by Hong Kong, Marco, and Taiwan. Year04 is a dummy variable for 2004. The symbols *, **, and *** stand for significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 10. Proximity and total factor productivity 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Dependent variable=log(value added1)  Dependent variable=log(value added2) 
Proximity_asset  0.618**      0.553**     
  (0.250)      (0.268)     
Proximity_employment    0.536**      0.384   
    (0.229)      (0.245)   
Proximity_output      0.564**      0.598** 
      (0.250)      (0.268) 
Log(labor)  0.068***  0.068***  0.068***  0.066***  0.065***  0.065*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Log(asset)  0.800***  0.801***  0.801***  0.804***  0.804***  0.804*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Log(labor)*year04  0.262***  0.262***  0.262***  0.239***  0.240***  0.239*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Log(asset)*year04  -0.179***  -0.179***  -0.179***  -0.155***  -0.155***  -0.155*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Firm age  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Private share%   0.083***  0.083***  0.084***  0.074***  0.074***  0.075*** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
HMT share%  0.303***  0.302***  0.303***  0.277***  0.276***  0.277*** 
  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Other foreign share%  0.683***  0.682***  0.683***  0.660***  0.660***  0.660*** 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Year04   0.545***  0.551***  0.546***  0.415***  0.420***  0.415*** 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
  -0.059  -0.043  -0.047  -0.011  0.025  -0.021 
  (0.084)  (0.081)  (0.084)  (0.090)  (0.087)  (0.090) 
             
Observations  104,437  104,437  104,437  103,128  103,128  103,128 
R-squared  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.94  0.94  0.94 
Note: Sample includes only firms that are surveyed in both censuses. Value added1 is computed as a weighted average of value added constructed from the output approach and 
value added computed from the income approach; value added2 is computed based only on the output approach. HMT stands for firms owned by Hong Kong, Marco, and Taiwan. 




Using census data at the firm level from 1995 and 2004, we have shown in this paper that China’s 
industrialization has been accompanied by increasing interactions among industries within regions. The 
pattern of industrial clustering to a large degree resembles the industrialization path in some European 
countries and other East Asian economies.  
In addition, our results indicate that the number of firms is growing faster and firm size is not 
significantly larger in clustered areas than in nonclustered regions, while at the same time there is a finer 
division of labor and closer technological affinity among firms. This pattern is similar to the East Asian 
cluster-based industrialization model led by numerous SMEs but differs from the observed patterns in the 
United States, where regional agglomeration and industrial districts were mainly driven by the presence 
of large firms.  
Cluster-based industrialization dominated by SMEs may have fit well with China’s comparative 
advantage. This business model makes more use of entrepreneurs and labor, and less of capital, compared 
to nonclustered large factories, and thus may have emerged as the choice of Chinese firms over time, 
leading to more clustered industries in China.  
One key benefit of cluster-based industrialization in China is that it helps lessen the credit 
constraints facing the vast number of SMEs. With lower minimum capital requirements, many low-wealth 
entrepreneurs can start businesses despite the constrained credit environment. Close proximity and intense 
competition among firms within a cluster may also reduce the temptation to act dishonestly, making 
frequent trade credit among firms within a cluster possible. All these factors help ease the reliance on 
external financing.  
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the results obtained do not necessarily indicate that 
financial-sector development is less important. Rather, clustering may be a second-best solution to the 
financing problem when the local conditions do not permit easy access to regular financing. One 
potentially fruitful line of research would be to study whether financial constraints indeed have induced 
the emergence of industrial clusters in China. A related issue is whether the substitution of clustering as 
an alternative mechanism for formal financing has affected the formation and growth of firms. For 
example, do firms tend to be larger in the absence of financial constraints as compared to those in 
industrial clusters? And do these differences in firm size distribution cause any efficiency loss? These 
topics are beyond the scope of the current paper, but are subjects we plan to research in the near future. 
Nonetheless, given that the ideal conditions for economic development are rarely in existence, the 
organization innovations embodied in clustering are essential, especially for developing countries, for 
which economic growth is particularly important. 
The cluster-based industrialization model may apply to other developing countries with similar 
endowments. However, one should be aware of institutional contexts that may affect cluster-based 
development. With the deepening division of labor inherent in the clustering mechanism, the demand for 
collective actions and public goods usually goes up. Therefore, local governments often need to play a 
key role in nurturing clustering development. Under fiscal decentralization, local governments in China 
are active in promoting cluster-based industrial development (Xu and Zhang, 2009). Yet local 
governments in many other developing countries are more passive in fostering industrial policy. In 
addition, governments should be cautious in promoting cluster-based development in industrial sectors 
that do not make use of comparative advantage (Rodríguez-Clare 2007). In the case of China, clusters 
have been proven to be more productive and more export-oriented. However, this may be due to the fact 
that most clusters in China are based on labor-intensive production technologies, which are in line with 
China’s comparative advantage. A region with overly concentrated capital-intensive industries, in contrast, 
may not experience the same rate of growth and exports. We leave a more in-depth study of this topic for 
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